The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 34 (2006)

Article 18

Prophets of Doom, Seers of Fortune: 20 Years of
Expert Evidence under the Oakes Test
Robert E. Charney
S. Zachary Green

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Charney, Robert E. and Green, S. Zachary. "Prophets of Doom, Seers of Fortune: 20 Years of Expert Evidence under the Oakes Test."
The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 34. (2006).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol34/iss1/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Prophets of Doom, Seers of Fortune:
20 Years of Expert Evidence
under the Oakes Test
Robert E. Charney and S. Zachary Green*

But Scientists, who ought to know,
Assure us that it must be so ...
Oh! let us never, never doubt
What nobody is sure about!
Hilaire Belloc
Courts often have to make predictions on the basis of expert evidence.
In tort cases courts rely on expert evidence to predict future economic
loss, life expectancy and future care costs.1 In criminal cases, and
particularly in dangerous offender applications, courts must consider
expert predictions on the risk that the offender will re-offend.2 Courts
recognize that such questions are “fraught with difficulty, for it is in
large measure pure speculation”.3 Future events cannot be “proved” or
“disproved” in the conventional sense that facts relating to past events
can be.
Accordingly, courts do not require that a plaintiff who seeks
compensation for future pecuniary loss satisfy the traditional “balance
of probabilities” standard. If the plaintiff establishes “a real and
substantial risk” of future pecuniary loss, she is entitled to
compensation. The amount of compensation will in turn depend on the
*

General Counsel and Counsel, respectively, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the
Attorney General of Ontario. REC was counsel for Ontario in Adler v. Ontario and McKinney v.
University of Guelph. The authors wish to thank Melissa Insanic for her assistance with the
citations. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the
position of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario.
1
John M. McLeish, “Contingencies; Loss of Interpersonal Relationships; The Material
Contribution Test; and Punitive, Exemplary, and Aggravated Damages” in Law Society of Upper
Canada, Special Lectures 2005: The Modern Law of Damages (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), at 279.
2
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 753.
3
Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] S.C.J. No. 6, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, at 249.
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degree of risk established and the contingencies that might affect future
earnings.4
Similarly, expert evidence in Charter cases, and particularly
evidence proffered in relation to Charter section 1, often involves
prediction and speculation about the potential impact of a statute or
government policy on future events. Experts in economics, sociology,
political science, psychology and other disciplines where academics
purport to have forensic expertise often provide the courts with
competing opinion evidence in relation to the various elements of the
Oakes5 test.
A review of the courts’ decisions in relation to Charter section 1
over the past 20 years reveals a number of examples where the courts
have had to weigh conflicting expert predictions in various disciplines.6
What would be the impact on sexual violence and other crimes against
women and children if there were no laws regulating pornography?7
What would be the effect on our pluralist society if all private religious
schools received full funding?8 What would be the economic
consequences of increasing welfare rates,9 or abolishing mandatory
retirement?10 Do health warnings on cigarette packages really
discourage smoking?11 And, most recently, will permitting private health
insurance increase or decrease (or have no effect on) the availability of
publicly funded health care resources?12 All of these are questions on

4

Graham v. Rourke, [1990] O.J. No. 2314, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at 12-15 (C.A.).
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”].
6
While the legal burden shifts in the course of the Charter analysis from the claimant
(who must prove the infringement) to the government (which must prove that the infringement is
justified), the reality is that in many cases — particularly those involving discrimination or
fundamental justice — both parties adduce expert opinion evidence not just for the purpose of
demonstrating (or refuting) the Charter s. 1 justification, but also for the purpose of demonstrating
(or refuting) the Charter right infringement itself. It is not always easy to tell where proving an
infringement ends and where justification begins; consider for example expert evidence adduced in
respect of the “correspondence” factor of the Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 equality analysis.
7
R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter “Butler”].
8
Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 [hereinafter “Adler”].
9
Masse v. Ontario, [1996] O.J. No. 363, 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Div. Ct.).
10
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229
[hereinafter “McKinney”].
11
RJR-MacDonald v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter
“RJR-MacDonald”].
12
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791
[hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
5
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which the courts have received expert evidence under Charter section 1
in order to determine whether an impugned law really furthered an
important government objective or was rationally related to that
objective.
In the first 10 years after Oakes, the Supreme Court articulated a
limited view of its role in choosing between conflicting expert evidence
in disciplines such as economics. In our view, this course of restraint in
the face of empirical uncertainty was wise. Even with the best evidence
available, the economic and social consequences of many government
policy decisions are not capable of prediction to any degree of certainty
approaching probability. Take, for example, the potential impact of fully
funding all private religious schools in Ontario’s pluralist society. In
Adler, some experts predicted that such funding would lead to the
gradual demise of the public school system and increased ethnic and
religious segregation and intolerance that would result in the progressive
Balkanization of society. Other experts predicted that full funding of
private religious schools would promote the Canadian values of
multiculturalism and religious freedom, and lead to greater understanding
and respect for religious minorities, thereby strengthening pluralism and
democracy. Each side pointed to other jurisdictions to support their
opinion. The reality, however, is that such predictions cannot be proven
in court; the only way to actually determine the impact of fully funding
all private religious schools in Ontario would be to fully fund all private
religious schools in Ontario, wait 30 or 40 years, and do a retrospective
study. But public policy is made prospectively, not retrospectively, and
in such matters educated guess-work is inevitable.
Courts have no greater expertise than legislatures in choosing
between competing economic or social scientific predictions, and where
there is no demonstrably right answer to a policy question, judicial
deference to the legislature is appropriate. In fact, a legislature is in a
better position than a court to choose between competing economic or
social scientific theories and the predictions that they generate. The
litigation process is well designed to find adjudicative facts, but not so
well designed to find legislative facts: that is, judicial fact-finding is
tailored towards coming to conclusions about discrete past events from
viva voce evidence, but is less suited to describing ongoing relationships
and continuing policies — and less suited still to calculating the
probable effect of hypothetical future policies — on the basis of
statistical or economic evidence.
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Courts assessing the continuing operation or future application of a
government policy are inevitably asked to choose between two (or
more) expert evidence reports. On what principled basis do courts prefer
the predictions of one properly qualified expert to another? The
principal mechanism for quality control in academic science is peer
review, through which the theses of individuals are critically scrutinized
for their credibility, cogency and significance by the community of
experts.13 The judicial model of fact-finding, by contrast, is premised on
a single authoritative fact-finder, whose informational inputs are the
sworn assertions of particular experts chosen for their conformity to the
pre-existing litigation position of the parties, and whatever concessions
can be obtained from these experts on cross-examination by non-expert
lawyers. As Manfredi and Maioni note:
Adversarial fact-finding complicates matters further at the trial court
level by presenting information in a manner that detracts from its
comprehensiveness, quality, and integrity; that promotes unrealistic
simplification; and that hinders the “logical order needed for a
systematic consideration of findings on a specific topic”. At the
appellate level, the adversarial nature of adjudication tends to
exaggerate the authoritativeness of information and to encourage
courts to treat hypotheses as axioms.14

Judicial fact-finding is deficient in this respect when compared with
governmental fact-finding, which may allow for more systematic
assessment of polycentric issues through statistical and economic
evidence, stakeholder input, and long-term financial and demographic
planning. By contrast, judicial assessment of policy issues tends to
suffer from what Greschner and Lewis call “telescopic vision”:
litigation is focused on a single aspect of a particular statute or
government program, with the effect that the single issue being litigated
is magnified in importance, and all other considerations, competing
interests, and claims for resources lose their focus.15 The institutional
limitations of the judicial process mean that courts are focused on a

13
J. Ziman, Real Science: What It Is, and What It Means (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), at 42-43.
14
C. Manfredi & A. Maioni, “Courts and Health Policy: Judicial Policy Making and
Publicly Funded Health Care in Canada” (2002) 27 J. Health. Pol. 213, at 218-19 (citations
omitted).
15
D. Greschner & S. Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-Based Decision-Making: Medicare in
the Courts” (2003) 82 Can. Bar Rev. 501, at 507-508.
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particular issue in isolation, and have only the evidence presented by the
particular parties before them. In contrast, legislatures must consider
each issue within a broader context and with the benefit of a greater
number of sources of information.
A number of cases in the 20 years since Oakes illustrate the
Supreme Court’s recognition that it cannot finally resolve ongoing
economic or social science debates through the judicial process, or make
judicial “findings” about the potential outcomes of future legislative
policy changes.

I. THE LABOUR TRILOGY
In 1987 the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether
freedom of association in Charter section 2(d) guaranteed a right to
strike and a right to bargain collectively. In what has become known as
the “Labour Trilogy”, the majority of the Supreme Court held that
freedom of association did not guarantee either of those rights. What is
significant is how the potential application of Charter section 1 to future
cases influenced the Court’s interpretation of the rights at issue. The
Court recognized that if the rights to strike and bargain collectively were
guaranteed, the Court would then have the responsibility to reconsider
all of the legislative decisions that limited those proposed rights, even
though there “are no clearly correct answers to these questions”:
The Court is called upon to determine, as a matter of constitutional
law, which government services are essential and whether the
alternative of arbitration is adequate compensation for the loss of a
right to strike. In the PSAC case, the Court must decide whether mere
postponement of collective bargaining is a reasonable limit, given the
Government’s substantial interest in reducing inflation and the growth
in government expenses. In the Dairy Workers case, the Court is asked
to decide whether the harm caused to dairy farmers through a closure
of the dairies is of sufficient importance to justify prohibiting strike
action and lockouts. None of these issues is amenable to principled
resolution. There are no clearly correct answers to these questions.
They are of a nature peculiarly apposite to the functions of the
Legislature. However, if the right to strike is found in the Charter, it
will be the courts which time and time again will have to resolve these
questions, relying only on the evidence and arguments presented by
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the parties, despite the social implications of each decision. This is a
legislative function into which the courts should not intrude.16

The Dairy Workers case is a case in point.17 The case concerned
Saskatchewan legislation that prohibited strikes and lockouts in the
dairy industry. Had the majority concluded that there was a right to
strike under Charter section 2(d), they would have been required to
decide “whether the harm caused to dairy farmers through a closure of
the dairies is of sufficient importance to justify prohibiting strike action
and lockouts”.18 As in many of the early Charter cases where the case
arose prior to the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Oakes, the evidence
adduced at the hearing in 1984 was very limited, and appears to have
consisted mainly of newspaper articles that both sides consented to
admit.
The majority’s concerns, however, would remain equally valid in
the face of conflicting economic expert opinions that each side could, no
doubt, have obtained. Whether any particular strike will, in the short or
long run, be good or bad for a particular sector of the economy depends
on a number of variables and future contingencies that necessarily
transforms every expert opinion into speculation and prediction. That
economic speculation and prediction will be based as much, and
sometimes more, on economic theory and personal values as it is on
facts or statistics. If one expert were to predict serious adverse
consequences for the dairy industry, and a different expert were to
predict that such consequences can be avoided (or that the strike will
actually benefit the dairy industry in the long run), how could the Court
choose between such predictions? The answer is that the Court should
not choose between competing economic predictions, but should defer
to the choice made by the legislature as long as credible expert evidence
is tendered in support of that position. If economic predictions are to be
made, the Court can ask no more than that the legislature establish “a
real and substantial risk” that certain adverse consequences will occur.
While the majority found it unnecessary to consider Charter section
1, Dickson C.J.’s concurring opinion (he found an infringement of
Charter section 2(d)) is consistent with this approach. On the basis of
16
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 419-20.
17
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 [hereinafter
“Dairy Workers”].
18
Id.
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the information contained in the newspaper articles appended to the
union’s affidavits, Dickson C.J. found that the “economic harm
threatened by a total work stoppage in the dairy processing industry”
justified the imposition of compulsory arbitration in the place of a right
to strike notwithstanding the competing evidence/predictions filed by
union officials.19
Similarly, in the companion PSAC case,20 Dickson C.J., in a
partially concurring opinion, was prepared to accept the expert opinion
of “three of the four economists at trial” who agreed that inflation was a
serious problem in 1982. More problematic was whether the imposition
of compensation controls on a relatively small (5 per cent) proportion of
the labour force was an “effective strategy for fighting inflation”. Again,
Dickson C.J. counselled judicial caution in matters of economic policy:
In my opinion, courts must exercise considerable caution when
confronted with difficult questions of economic policy. It is not our
judicial role to assess the effectiveness or wisdom of various
government strategies for solving pressing economic problems. The
question how best to combat inflation has perplexed economists for
several generations. It would be highly undesirable for the courts to
attempt to pronounce on the relative importance of various suggested
causes of inflation, such as the expansion of the money supply, fiscal
deficits, foreign inflation, or the built-in inflationary expectations of
individual economic actors. A high degree of deference ought properly
to be accorded to the government’s choice of strategy in combating
this complex problem.21

II. IRWIN TOY
Similar cautions have been expressed in other cases where competing
economic or social science evidence was tendered in court in relation to
Charter section 1. For example, in Irwin Toy the Supreme Court was
confronted with competing evidence regarding the susceptibility of
young children to media manipulation and their ability to differentiate
between reality and fiction.22 While the evidence was consistent with

19

Dairy Workers, supra, note 17, at 463 per Dickson C.J.
P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 [hereinafter “PSAC”].
21
PSAC, id., at 442.
22
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
[hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].
20
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regard to young children, the opinion evidence was more divided when
children aged 6-13 were involved. Again, the Supreme Court confirmed
that “courts are not called upon to substitute judicial opinions for
legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise time”.23 It is
the legislature, not the court, which should weigh and assess conflicting
scientific evidence:
The same can be said of evaluating competing credible scientific
evidence and choosing thirteen, as opposed to ten or seven, as the
upper age limit for the protected group here in issue. Where the
legislature mediates between the competing claims of different groups
in the community, it will inevitably be called upon to draw a line
marking where one set of claims legitimately begins and the other
fades away without access to complete knowledge as to its precise
location. If the legislature has made a reasonable assessment as to
where the line is most properly drawn, especially if that assessment
involves weighing conflicting scientific evidence and allocating scarce
resources on this basis, it is not for the court to second guess. That
would only be to substitute one estimate for another.24

This caution regarding conflicting scientific evidence was also
raised in the context of the “minimal impairment” step of the Oakes test:
Thus, in matching means to ends and asking whether rights or
freedoms are impaired as little as possible, a legislature mediating
between the claims of competing groups will be forced to strike a
balance without the benefit of absolute certainty concerning how that
balance is best struck. …
When striking a balance between the claims of competing groups, the
choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an
assessment of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified
demands on scarce resources.25

Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed that the issue for a court
which is called upon to assess “competing social science evidence” is
not to decide which social scientist is right, but to decide whether the

23
Id., at 889, citing R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 713, at 781-82.
24
Id., at 889-90.
25
Id., at 993.
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legislature had, on the evidence tendered, a “reasonable basis”26 to make
the policy choice it made:
In the instant case, the Court is called upon to assess competing social
science evidence respecting the appropriate means for addressing the
problem of children’s advertising. The question is whether the
government had a reasonable basis, on the evidence tendered, for
concluding that the ban on all advertising directed at children impaired
freedom of expression as little as possible given the government’s
pressing and substantial objective.27

An important issue in Irwin Toy was whether the government’s
Charter section 1 case must be limited to the evidence that was before
the legislature when it passed the legislation, or whether the Court
should consider expert evidence and studies post-dating the enactment
of the challenged legislation. The reality of today’s political world is
that legislation is often passed without the benefit of a thorough
scientific or expert analysis. Politicians often proceed on the basis of
limited empirical evidence or even (what is to them) experience and
common sense. Indeed, politicians are often criticized when the
resolution of a pressing policy issue is delayed to permit more study or
review. The Supreme Court in Irwin Toy concluded that the
government’s case is not restricted to evidence contemporary with the
adoption of the legislation, and that “the government surely can and
should draw upon the best evidence currently available”.28 To proceed
otherwise would turn the Charter analysis from a review of legislation to
an inquiry into what the legislators themselves knew or understood
when the legislation was passed.

III. MCKINNEY
McKinney dealt with the constitutional validity of the definition of “age”
in the Ontario Human Rights Code29 that permitted mandatory
retirement provisions in contracts of employment.30 Numerous experts in
economics, industrial relations, social science and demographics
26
The Court also refers to this as a “sound evidentiary basis” for the government’s
conclusions. See Irwin Toy, supra, note 22, at 999.
27
Id., at 994.
28
Id., at 984.
29
R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 10.
30
Supra, note 10.
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provided conflicting predictions on the potential impact of prohibiting
mandatory retirement on industrial relations, hiring, training, dismissal,
monitoring and evaluation, pensions, compensation, and youth
employment. Once again the majority of the Court recognized that
judges were not in a position to decide which set of expert predictions
was correct:
In undertaking this task, it is important again to remember that the
ramifications of mandatory retirement on the organization of the
workplace and its impact on society generally are not matters capable
of precise measurement, and the effect of its removal by judicial fiat is
even less certain. Decisions on such matters must inevitably be the
product of a mix of conjecture, fragmentary knowledge, general
experience and knowledge of the needs, aspirations and resources of
society, and other components. They are decisions of a kind where
those engaged in the political and legislative activities of Canadian
democracy have evident advantages over members of the judicial
branch, as Irwin Toy, supra, at p. 993-94, has reminded us. This does
not absolve the judiciary of its constitutional obligation to scrutinize
legislative action to ensure reasonable compliance with constitutional
standards, but it does import greater circumspection than in areas such
as the criminal justice system where the courts’ knowledge and
understanding affords it a much higher degree of certainty.31

The Supreme Court reiterated that the “operative question in these
cases is whether the government had a reasonable basis, on the evidence
tendered”, for its policy decision. Given the competing and conflicting
economic predictions, it was reasonable for the legislature to opt for “a
cautious approach to the matter”:
The Legislature, like the Court, was faced with competing socioeconomic theories, about which respected academics not unnaturally
differ. In my view, the Legislature is entitled to choose between them
and surely to proceed cautiously in effecting change on such important
issues of social and economic concern. On issues of this kind, where
there is competing social science evidence, I have already discussed
what Irwin Toy, supra, has told us about the stance the Court should
take. In a word, the question for this Court is whether the government
had a reasonable basis for concluding that the legislation impaired the

31

McKinney, supra, note 10, at 304-305.
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relevant right as little as possible given the government’s pressing and
substantial objectives.32

IV. BUTLER
In Butler, the Charter section 1 analysis focused on the evidence that
justified the prohibition on the distribution of obscene materials.33 Did
the evidence “prove” that exposure to obscene materials resulted in
“antisocial attitudinal changes” and make “degradation, humiliation,
victimization, and violence in human relationships appear normal and
acceptable”?34 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the social science
literature on the causal relationship between pornography and the risk of
harm to society “remains subject to controversy”.35 The Supreme Court
reviewed the numerous published reports with inconsistent conclusions,
and held that “a direct link between obscenity and harm to society may
be difficult, if not impossible, to establish”. In the face of inconclusive
social science evidence, the Supreme Court adopted the Irwin Toy
standard of whether Parliament had a “reasonable basis” for its policy
choice.36 In this context a “reasoned apprehension of harm” was
sufficient to meet the Oakes test.

V. RJR-MACDONALD
The most extensive discussion of the issue of the role of the Court when
confronted with conflicting social science evidence is found in RJRMacDonald, where the Supreme Court had to analyze the conflicting
social science evidence relating to tobacco advertising and unattributed
health warnings on tobacco products.37
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and La Forest J. agreed that an
“overtechnical” approach to section 1 was to be avoided, and that the
“proof to the standards required by science” was not required.38

32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id., at 309.
Supra, note 7.
Id., at 491-94.
Id., at 501.
Id., at 502.
Supra, note 11.
RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 11, at paras. 126-127.
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To La Forest J., the scientific uncertainty regarding the causal
connection between advertising and tobacco consumption and addiction
did not preclude the government from prohibiting such advertising even
if it limited freedom of expression. He described the causal connections
as one of “the mysteries of human psychology. Many of the workings of
the human mind, and the causes of human behaviour, remain hidden to
our understanding and will no doubt remain so for quite some time”.39 In
the face of a gap in scientific knowledge of the causes of tobacco
consumption, a strict application of the Oakes analysis would:
place an impossible onus on Parliament by requiring it to produce
definitive social scientific evidence respecting the root causes of a
pressing social concern every time it wishes to address its effects. This
could have the effect of virtually paralyzing the operation of
government in the socio-economic sphere…To require Parliament to
wait for definitive social science conclusions every time it wishes to
make social policy would impose an unjustifiable limit on legislative
power by attributing a degree of scientific accuracy to the art of
government which, in my view, is simply not consonant with reality.40

If courts insist on “proof to the standards required by science”,
legislatures will simply be unable to make any policy decision in areas
where such decisions are based on forecasting the future or on imperfect
scientific knowledge. And the reality is that all policy decisions with
any relationship to economics involve some degree of forecasting.
Justice La Forest adopted the following observations from LeBel
J.A., who was then on the Quebec Court of Appeal:
Interpreted literally, mechanically, without nuance, the Oakes test and
the burden of proof which it imposes on the state would most often
negate its ability to legislate.
Moreover, such an approach misconceives the nature of a
constitutional case such as this. It cannot be dealt with as if it were an
ordinary civil trial. We are not dealing with a matter in which, for
example, a particular litigant seeks to demonstrate that his tobacco
consumption and the advertising of a manufacturer whose cigarettes
he consumed caused his lung cancer or his emphysema. It is rather a
question of determining the basis on which a legislator may choose to
act, where the outcome is uncertain.

39
40

Id., at para. 66.
Id., at para. 67.
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It is necessary to understand the limits and the nature of policy
choices. It is often difficult to forecast the future and to anticipate the
beneficial or negative consequences of government policy. A wellconceived policy may be poorly applied. The necessary institutional
resources may fail; unforeseen obstacles may intervene. If one is to
apply rigorously the criterion of civil proof on the balance of
probabilities it will be impossible to govern. On this basis, it would
not be possible to make difficult but sometimes necessary legislative
choices. There would be conferred on the courts a supervisory role
over a state itself essentially inactive.41

Accordingly, in the face of conflicting complex social science
evidence, La Forest J. was of the view that a “high degree of judicial
deference” was appropriate, and the Attorney General of Canada “need
only demonstrate that Parliament had a rational basis for introducing the
measures contained in the Act”.42
Justice McLachlin agreed that courts must remain “sensitive to the
social and political context of the impugned law and allow for
difficulties of proof inherent in that context”, but she emphasized that
there was a “bottom line” that courts must maintain to ensure that
“before the state can override constitutional rights, there be a reasoned
demonstration of the good which the law may achieve in relationship to
the seriousness of the infringement”.43 While she agreed with La Forest
J. that “proof to the standard required by science is not required” she
insisted on maintaining “the civil standard of proof on a balance of
probabilities at all stages of the proportionality analysis”. Justice
McLachlin was careful to explain however, that “discharge of the civil
standard does not require scientific demonstration; the balance of
probabilities may be established by the application of common sense to
what is known, even though what is known may be deficient from a
scientific point of view”.44 Thus, in the case of legislation aimed at
reducing tobacco consumption, where the legislation “is directed at
changing human behaviour…the causal relationship may not be
scientifically measurable”, and the Court may find a causal connection
“on the basis of reason or logic”.45

41
42
43
44
45

Id., at para. 67.
Id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 129.
Id., at para. 137.
Id., at para. 154.
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While McLachlin J. was prepared to find a causal connection
between certain forms of advertising, package warnings and
consumption on the basis of reason, she was not able to see the
connection “based on logic or reason” between the absolute prohibition
on the use of a tobacco trade mark on articles other than tobacco
products and tobacco consumption.
Another issue that both La Forest J. and McLachlin J. commented
upon was the question of appellate court deference to the fact finding of
the trial judges. As a general proposition, it is a well established
principle that an appellate court may only interfere with the factual
findings of a trial judge where the trial judge made a manifest error and
where the error influenced the trial judge’s final conclusion or overall
appreciation of the evidence.46 Both La Forest J. and McLachlin J. (in a
decision which foreshadows her later decision in the Chaoulli case)
agreed that this principle applies to adjudicative facts, but will not apply
with equal force to factual findings related to broad socio-economic
facts and predictions upon which legislative policy decisions are usually
made. Justice La Forest explained that:
The privileged position of the trial judge does not extend to the
assessment of “social” or “legislative” facts that arise in the law
making process and require the legislature or a court to assess complex
social science evidence and to draw general conclusions concerning
the effect of legal rules on human behaviour… conclusions of this
nature are most accurately characterized as social or legislative facts
because they involve predictions about the social effects of legal rules,
which are invariably subject to dispute.47

With regard to the alleged causal connection between tobacco
advertising and consumption, La Forest J. held that appellate court
judges are as well placed as trial judges to make such findings. Indeed,
if appellate courts were bound by trial court rulings regarding legislative
facts, legislation that was valid in one province could be invalid in
another province because of the trial judges’ disagreement regarding
socio-economic facts and predictions, and trial judges could ignore
Supreme Court precedent simply by making different factual

46
Dorval v. Bouvier, [1968] S.C.R. 288; Lapointe v. Hospital Le Gardeur, [1992] S.C.J.
No. 11, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 351, at 358.
47
RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 11, at para. 79.
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conclusions regarding the conflicting social-science evidence presented
in the case before them.
It is also clear from the balance of La Forest J.’s Charter section 1
analysis that even if the traditional principle of appellate court deference
to the trial judge’s factual findings did apply, he would have found that
the trial judge had “disregarded a substantial amount of evidence that
might otherwise have substantiated the government’s belief in a rational
connection”,48 and had also asked himself the wrong question. The role
of the trial judge was not to decide between two bodies of expert
opinion on the connection between advertising and consumption, but
whether the legislature had a reasonable basis for concluding that such a
connection existed.
Justice McLachlin shared La Forest J.’s general approach to this
issue of deference to the trial judge’s finding, but recognized that the
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts may be hard to
maintain in practice. Her conclusion on this point was:
Suffice it to say that in the context of the s. 1 analysis, more deference
may be required to findings based on evidence of a purely factual
nature whereas a lesser degree of deference may be required where the
trial judge has considered social science and other policy oriented
evidence. As a general matter, appellate courts are not as constrained
by the trial judge’s findings in the context of the s. 1 analysis as they
are in the course of non-constitutional litigation, since the impact of
the infringement on constitutional rights must often be assessed by
reference to a broad review of social, economic and political factors in
addition to scientific facts. At the same time, while appellate courts are
not bound by the trial judge’s findings in respect of social science
evidence, they should remain sensitive to the fact that the trial judge
has had the advantage of hearing competing expert testimony
firsthand. The trial judge’s findings with respect to the credibility of
certain witnesses may be useful when the appeal court reviews the
record.49

VI. CHAOULLI
We have seen that, in the first decade of reviewing expert evidence
under Charter section 1, the Supreme Court articulated the deferential

48
49

Id., at paras. 87-92.
Id., at para. 141.
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principle that the legislature is entitled to choose from among competing
expert opinions or predictions, even in the absence of demonstrable
proof that its choice is the “right” one. In the main, the Supreme Court
continued to apply this deferential principle throughout the second
decade of Charter section 1 review, finding that Parliament was entitled,
in the face of conflicting and inconclusive social science evidence, to
prohibit the possession of child pornography50 and marijuana,51 and to
place strict limits on the spending abilities of third parties during
election periods,52 on the basis of a reasoned apprehension of harm.53
Hogg has identified empirical or scientific uncertainty as one of a
number of factors considered by the Supreme Court to warrant
deference to the legislature:
Among the considerations that are invoked by the Court in support of
a degree of deference to the legislative choice are: where the law is
designed to protect a vulnerable group (children, for example), where
the law is premised on complex social-science evidence (about the
effect of advertising, for example), where the law reconciles the
interests of competing groups (mandatory retirement, for example) and
where the law allocates scarce resources.54

Having regard to Hogg’s list of considerations in support of judicial
deference, a legal prognosticator (never more accurate than a social
scientist or economist) would likely have predicted that Chaoulli v.
Quebec constituted a perfect case for the Court to take a restrained
approach to the expert evidence.55 Chaoulli concerned a challenge to
provisions of Quebec’s health insurance statutes that prohibited the
making of private contracts of insurance to cover the cost of services
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R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45.
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571; R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 80, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735.
52
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827.
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This is not to say that the government was always successful in those cases in which
conflicting social science evidence was central. In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001]
S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 and Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General),
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advanced by the government, but did not uphold the impugned legislation under the minimal
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paid for under the provincial plan.56 The purpose of this prohibition, as
determined by the trial judge and accepted by a majority of the judges of
the Supreme Court,57 was to prevent the establishment of a parallel
private health insurance system that would compete with the public
system for the finite health care resources that existed in the province.
The claimants contended that the prohibition went beyond what was
necessary to ensure the integrity of the public health insurance plan.58
It is obvious that questions of the institutional design of a provincial
health insurance plan involve all four of the considerations in favour of
judicial deference identified by Hogg, just as it is obvious that such
questions are deeply and essentially politically contested. As is the case
with many policy questions, while there is no shortage of expert
opinions based on competing economic theories, there is little consensus
and no demonstrably correct answer. The claimants in Chaoulli relied
on categorical expert opinion to the effect that the efficient provision of
health care in Quebec “will only be reached after the government
decides to introduce a health care system based on [private] contracting
or reimbursement”, while the government’s expert opined in similarly
unequivocal terms that “allowing private insurance to be available as an
alternative to Medicare would have profound negative impacts on the
public system rather than none as is assumed. It would not increase
availability of services in the public sector or reduce waiting lists.
Instead, it would divert resources from the publicly financed program to
be available to private activities and it would increase total Canadian
expenditures on health.”59 Both sides pointed to the experience in other
jurisdictions as conclusive proof of the validity of their own contentions.

56
Five other provinces have similar statutory bars to private health insurance, including
Ontario (see Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 14).
57
See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2000] J.Q. no 479, at paras. 258-259 (S.C.)
per Piché J., adopted by Binnie and LeBel JJ., at para. 241 and Deschamps J., at paras. 23 and 5455.
58
The claimants relied on R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at
792 for the proposition that Charter s. 7 is infringed where “legislation infringes life, liberty or
security of the person in a manner that is unnecessarily broad, going beyond what is needed to
accomplish the governmental objective”. The unfortunate effect of the Heywood overbreadth
doctrine is correctly identified by Hogg: “a judge who disapproves of a law will always be able to
find that it is overbroad.” P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2006 looseleaf ed.
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997), at 44-45.
59
See the expert evidence reviewed in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2000] J.Q.
no 479, at paras. 117-19 and 102-15 (S.C.).
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At the Supreme Court, all seven judges concluded that, at least in
some circumstances, the statutory prohibition against buying private
health insurance compromised the personal security of Quebec
residents. The Court divided over whether the impugned provisions
were justified by the need to preserve the public health insurance plan.
Three judges (McLachlin C.J. and Major J., writing for themselves and
Bastarache J.) held that the prohibition against contracting for private
health insurance infringed Charter section 7 as well as section 1 of the
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and that neither
infringement was justified. Three judges (Binnie and LeBel JJ., writing
for themselves and for Fish J.), found no infringement of Charter section
7, because the prohibition was “directly related to Quebec’s interest in
promoting a need-based system and in ensuring its viability and
efficiency”,60 and found that the infringement of the Quebec Charter
section 1 was justified. The seventh judge, Deschamps J., found an
unjustified infringement of the Quebec Charter but did not consider the
Canadian Charter. In the result, the impugned provisions were declared
to be inconsistent with the Quebec Charter as an unjustified
infringement of the right to personal security.
Justice Deschamps was the only judge that dealt in detail with the
issue of due deference,61 and she was clearly of the view that this was
not an appropriate case to show deference to the legislature’s choice.
Indeed, her reasons evince a certain impatience with the protracted
debate among policy-makers, elected legislators and the public
regarding the merits and efficacy of single-payer public health
insurance: she noted what she viewed as “the tendency to focus the
debate on a sociopolitical philosophy” rather than on “the urgency of
taking concrete action”, and held that the government’s inertia or
“failure to act” could not be used to justify judicial deference.62
Inverting the earlier authority that elected legislators, not courts, are
best positioned to assess complex social scientific evidence and to come
to a reasoned apprehension of the harm that legislation is intended to
address, Deschamps J. instead praised the superiority of courts in
coming to conclusions about the efficacy of public health care. Courts
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make decisions “on legal principles and not on a socio-political
discourse that is disconnected from reality”.63 Unlike the “emotional”
participants in public debate, courts are able to take a step back and
consider the various positions objectively.64 Courts can consider
evidence concerning the historical, social and economic aspects of
health insurance policy, or any other evidence that may be material.65
Courts “have a duty to rise above political debate”.66
Similarly, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. took a dim view of the
government’s reliance on the policy analysis and recommendations
found in reports such as the Romanow Commission Report and the
Kirby Committee Report, noting that “the import of these reports, which
differ in many of their conclusions, is a matter of some debate”.67
Whereas the earlier cases (reviewed above) had held that governments
are entitled to more deference when they make policy choices
concerning conflicting or debatable social science evidence, McLachlin
C.J. and Major J. held that the conclusions of “other bodies on other
material” could not displace the Court’s ability to come to its own
conclusions on the evidence before it.
This effusive praise for the superior ability of courts to reach
objective and evidence-based conclusions on issues of health policy
might have been more persuasive but for the fact that the trial judge who
heard the expert evidence came to the opposite conclusion on the
substantive issue in the case:
La preuve a montré que le droit d’avoir recours à un système parallèle
privé de soins, invoque par les requérants, aurait des répercussions sur
les droits de l’ensemble de la population. Il ne faut pas jouer à
l’autruche. L’établissement d’un système de santé parallèle privé
aurait pour effet de menacer l’intégrité, le bon fonctionnement ainsi
que la viabilité du système public. Les articles…empêchent cette
éventualité et garantissent l’existence d’un système de santé public de
qualité au Québec.68
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This finding was affirmed by Forget J.A. at the Quebec Court of
Appeal and by the dissenting judges at the Supreme Court.69
It is not surprising that the judges disagreed with one another about
the probable future effects of expanding private health insurance in
Quebec. After all, the expert witnesses in Chaoulli disagreed among
themselves as to the likely impact that removing the prohibition on
private insurance would have on the public plan. The comprehensive
public health care reform studies produced by the Romanow
Commission70 and the Kirby Committee71 made only equivocal
predictions of the effect of parallel private systems on public health
care. Indeed, legislators, professionals and members of the public
frequently disagree among themselves on these same issues. It is
therefore to be expected that judges, like other reasonable and wellinformed people, will not all be of the same view with respect to such
confounding questions.
More perplexing is the question of why the court felt it ought to
determine the issue at all. As Choudhry has commented:
It would have been more honest for both the majority and dissenting
judges to acknowledge that public policy in this area is based on
approximations and extrapolations from the available evidence,
inferences from comparative data, and, on occasion, educated guesses.
Absent a large-scale policy experiment, this is all the evidence that is
likely to be available.72
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See [2002] J.Q. no 759 (C.A.), at paras. 61-63, per Forget J.A.; Chaoulli at paras. 166,
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The proper question for the Supreme Court, consistent with its
earlier decisions in areas of empirical uncertainty and competing expert
opinion, was whether the impugned legislation responded to the
legislature’s reasoned apprehension of harm. The government’s
evidence was more than sufficient to meet that standard. Yet neither
McLachlin C.J. and Major J. nor the dissenting judges adverted to the
Court’s own precedents for deference in the face of conflicting social
science evidence, as articulated in Irwin Toy, Butler and RJRMacDonald. Instead, the judges disagreed with each other at the level of
policy as to whether the removal of the prohibition on private insurance
would or would not adversely affect Quebec’s public health insurance
plan in the future.
Given the potential consequences that might result from tinkering
with a multi-billion dollar social program that provides services to
literally millions of Quebeckers, judicial restraint surely would have
been preferable. Health care is at the very centre of policy-making in the
provinces, and questions about its provision tend to dominate political
discourse: “these are the issues upon which elections are won and
lost.”73 Public health insurance is not an issue at the margins of public
policy; on the contrary, it is heavily politically contested and
inextricably related to questions of distributive justice, economic
planning, taxation levels, and fiscal sustainability. All of these questions
call for trade-offs and compromises made on the basis of incomplete
knowledge, interjurisdictional comparisons, and best guesses. As the
Supreme Court itself noted in Irwin Toy, democratic institutions are
meant to let us all share in the responsibility for these difficult choices.74
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